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Japan has now experienced over a decade of slow growth and deflation. This period has also 
been associated with protracted problems in the banking sector.  A wide range of measures have 
been tried in to restore health in the banking sector including recapitalization, the extension of 
100% guarantees to all deposits, and central bank purchases of  shares held by banks. It has also 
argued that ending deflation is an important ingredient in restoring banking sector health. This 
paper develops a general equilibrium of the banking sector. In our model the banking sector 
produces an intermediate good that is used to produce investment goods and a variable fraction 
of consumption goods.  We then assess the implications of alternative policies designed to assist 
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1. Introduction 
 
Japan has experienced over a decade of low growth. In addition, CPI inflation has 
declined from 3%  in 1990 to a  level of -0.7%  in 2003 and nominal interest rates are 
now about zero. This period of slow growth and deflation has also been accompanied by 
persistent problems in the Japanese banking sector. Loans have fallen by 18 percent 
between 1997 and 2003, deposits have stagnated and employment in the banking sector 
has fallen by over 17 percent. These declines produced a number of important 
government initiatives designed to assist the banking sector. The Japanese government 
has extended 100% guarantees to bank deposits, offered loan guarantees, re-capitalized 
the banking system, and the Bank of Japan has purchased private equity shares from 
banks in an effort to improve bank balance sheets. The persistent nature of the problems 
in Japan’s banking sector has also increased pressure on the Bank of Japan to end 
deflation in the expectation that higher inflation will widen spreads on lending rates and 
thereby increase profitability. 
 
This paper develops a dynamic general equilibrium model with a banking sector that 
can be used for assessing the effects of these policies on welfare and the size and 
profitability of the banking sector. Our model builds on the previous models of Gillman 
(1993), Aiyagari, Braun and Eckstein (1998) and Erosa (2001). Our general equilibrium 
model has the following structure. Money enters via a cash-in-advance constraint and 
separate sectors produce goods and banking services. Goods are produced using capital 
and labor. The banking sector also uses capital and labor to produce credit services that 
facilitate both exchange and investment. We model the industrial organization of the 
banking sector in two alternative ways for robustness. In one version of the model,   2 
banks are perfectly competitive and profits arise through a strategic complementarity 
with the output of the goods sector. In the other version of the model, banks are 
monopolistically competitive. 
 
We then calibrate the model to Japanese data and use the model to compare and contrast 
the effects of alternative policies designed to assist the banking sector. We find that 
recapitalizations can restore profitability to the banking sector but have no effect on the 
size of the banking sector- employment and provision of credit services still fall. In the 
model with monopolistic competition this policy produces higher welfare than a passive 
policy that allows profitability to be restored due to exit and higher markups. Deposit 
guarantees, in contrast, have positive effects on the size of the sector no effect on 
profitability and negative welfare effects.  The  revenue benefits generated by deposit 
guarantees gets passed through and results in higher input prices.  A higher average 
inflation rate increases demand for banking services by households and but reduces 
demand for interemporal credit services. The former effect is more pronounced than the 
latter effect and profitability and employment in the banking sector increase with the 
inflation rate. However, this policy has negative effects implications for welfare.  
 
The model extends the specification of the credit services sector developed in Gillman 
(1993), Aiyagari Braun and Eckstein (1998) and Erosa (2001) by using a single 
consumption good as in Gillman and Kejak (2002).  [more references to other literature 
to be added.] 
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2. The Model 
 
In this section we develop a general model that nests as special cases both perfectly and 
monopolistically competitive structures of the banking sector. The household decision 
problem is as follows. 
 
2.1 Household decision problem 
 
Household preferences are defined over consumption and leisure with the following 
utility function 
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Period budget constraint: 
 
   




P 1t 1!#nt ( )wtnt + P 1t{rt !#kt(rt !")}kt + Mt + Bt + P 1tprt
  (2.2) 
 
where, 
   
at ! 0,1 " # $ % is the fraction of consumption goods purchased with cash, 
   
b! 0,1 " # $ %is 
the fraction of investment goods purchased with cash,    Bt+1are new purchases of 
nominal bonds in period t and  prtare profits. The fraction of consumption goods 
purchased with cash  atvaries depending on the relative exchange cost of cash versus   4 




Households face the following cash in advance constraint: 
 
   
bP 1t kt+1 ! (1!")kt ( )+ P 1tatct = Mt   (2.3) 




Households divide their time endowment between labor market activities and leisure: 





Definition 1: Households’ problem. 
The household’s problem is to maximize  (2.1), subject to equations (2.2)- (2.4)  by 
choice of the sequences     {ct,kt+1,ht+1,at,nt,nht,lt,Mt+1,Bt+1}t=0
!  given sequences of prices, 
profits and government policy variables 
   
P 1t,P 2t,rt,wt, prt,!nt,!kt,vt { }t=0
"
 and given the 
initial conditions k(0), h(0), B(0) and M(0). 
 
Properties of household optimization   5 
 




   
u1t ! "t P 2t 1! at ( )+ P 1tat # $ % &! µtP 1tat = 0  (2.5) 
 
n: 
   
!u2t + "tP 1t 1!#nt ( )wtht = 0  (2.6) 
 
   Mt+1:     !"t + #"t+1 + #µt+1 = 0  (2.7) 
   Bt+1: 




+ # "t+1 $ % & ’ = 0  (2.8) 
 
   kt+1: 
   
!µtbP 1t + µt+1P 1t+1"b(1!#)! $t bP 1t + (1! b)P 2t % & ’ (
+"$t+1 bP 1t+1 + (1! b)P 2t+1 % & ’ ((1!#)+ P 1t+1 rt+1 !)kt+1(rt+1 !#) % & ’ ( { }
= 0
  (2.9) 
 
a: 
   
!t P 2t " P 1t # $ % &" P 1tµt = 0  (2.10) 
 
Next observe that 
 




P 2t " P 1t
P 1t
= Rt  (2.11) 
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These first order conditions imply the following no-arbitrage restrictions: 
 
 
   










  (2.13) 
This equation relates the marginal rate of substitution between leisure and consumption 
to the relative price of leisure and consumption. In this economy inflation acts as a tax 




   
!u1t+1P 1t
u1tP 1t+1
1+ Rt " # $ % =1  (2.14) 
Define the inflation rate: 
   
1+! t +1 ( ) " P 1(t +1) / P 1(t)then the above equation is the 
standard intertemporal first order condition. 
 
 














=1  (2.15) 
Combining (2.14) and (2.15) we have: 
 
   
1+ Rt = (1!")+










  (2.16) 
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Notice that equations (2.11), (2.13)-(2.16) and (2.2)-(2.4) constitute 8 equations in the 8 
unknown household choice variables. 
 
 
Technology & Feasibility 
The production side of the economy consists of three sectors- a goods sector that 
produces a single storable good, a banking sector that produces credit services and a 
credit goods sector that combines goods with credit services to produce credit goods. 
 
Goods are produced using the following Cobb-Douglas  production technology. 
 
   
ygt = kgt
! ngt
1"!Agt   (2.17) 
Production in the banking sector by the i
th producer is specified in a general way to 
allow for the possibility of fixed costs associated with losses from existing outstanding 
loans !iK , increasing returns to scale governed by the parameter ! and/or a strategic 
complementarity, zt: 
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  (2.18) 
 
Credit goods production combines credit services with goods using a Leontief 
production technology: 
     8 
 
   
y2t = min yg,2t,st / qt ( )  (2.19) 
where, 
 















  (2.20) 
We think of credit goods production as being the activity performed, for instance, by a 
car dealer when an individual uses the dealer to arrange financing at the time of 
purchase. Below in some of the simulations we will assume that credit goods production 
is subject to a productive externality. This turns out to be equivalent to monetary 
economies analyzed by Gillman (1993)or Aiyagari, Braun and Eckstein (1998) in which 
there are a continuum of credit goods that differ in terms of the amount of credit 
services they require. 
 
The feasibility constraint for the goods sector is:   
 
 
   
ygt ! ctat + yg2t + b(kt+1 " (1"#)kt).  (2.21) 
The Credit goods feasibility constraint is: 
 
 
   
y2t ! (1" at)ct + (1" b) kt+1 " (1"#)kt $ % & ’+ gt   (2.22) 
 
 
Capital is constrained by the following restriction 
 
 
kgt + kst ! kt.  (2.23) 
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And the labor feasibility restriction is: 
 
 




Market Structure  
 
Goods producers are perfectly competitive. They chose their inputs according to the 
following marginal product pricing rules: 
 
   
wt = Agt f2t   (2.25) 
 
   
rt = Agt f1t .  (2.26) 
 
Credit goods producers also behave competitively. They will choose their inputs in the 
following way: 
 











  (2.27) 
where, 
 
   
















  (2.28) 
and,   10 
 
   
St / qt = yg,2t .  (2.29) 
The zero profit condition for credit goods production implies the following restriction 
on prices: 
     P 2t = P 1t + P stqt .  (2.30) 
 
 
We will consider two distinct industrial organization structures for the banking sector. 
First, we will consider a situation in which banks are monopolistic competitors. The 
rationale for such an assumption can be found, for instance, in Hellwig(1977) who 
describes the comparative advantage that an old lender has relative to new lenders due 
to the fixed costs incurred in collecting information about the quality of the recipient of 
credit. A special case of this industrial organization structure is a perfectly competitive 
market sector where profits are generated by a productive externality  z as in Romer 
(1986).  In the empirical analysis below we will compare and contrast both structures.    
The solution to a bank’s optimization problem is found in two steps.  
The first step is to derive a cost function by solving the following cost minimization 
problem: 
 
   
min
ks,i ,ns,i
rtks,it + wtns,it  (2.31) 
subject to (2.18). 
 
The solution to this problem is a cost function:   11 
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The second step is to express profits in the following way: 
 




P stSit " P 1tC rt,wt,sit,As,it,zt ( )  (2.33) 
and then use (2.27) to substitute in the inverse demand function: 
 









P stSit ) P 1tC rt,wt,Sit,As,it,zt ( ).  (2.34) 
The first order condition is: 
 














= MCt  (2.35) 
where MCt is the derivative of the cost function with respect to si(t). Finally, we also 
have the following restrictions linking wages and rental rates in the goods production 
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#(1$"1$" 2 )  (2.37) 
Notice next that real profits are then given by: 
 




St +!Kt ( ) 1"#$(% 1 +% 2) & ’ ( )"!Kt { }.  (2.38) 
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If we choose the fixed cost parameter !  so that the banking sector has zero long-run 
profits this implies from equation (2.38) that !  satisfies the following restriction: 
 









) * = +   (2.39) 
Notice that under the assumption of constant returns to scale in the banking sector we 
have: 
 








’ ( = )   (2.40) 
 
Notice also that if there is no fixed cost and constant returns to scale in capital and labor 
economic profits are zero.  However, perfect competition is also consistent with non-
zero profits in the presence of a productive externality in z. Below we will report some  
simulation results for the case with perfect competition where profits arise due to a 
strategic complementarity of banking with goods production. 
 
The government budget constraint is given by: 
 
   
P 1t!ntwthtnt + P 1t!kt rt "# ( )kt + Mt+1 " Mt +
Bt+1
1+ Rt+1
" Bt = P 2tgt   (2.41) 
 
 
According to this budget constraint government purchases are credit goods and money 
enters and leaves the economy via open market purchases and sales of nominal bonds. 
 
Given the above definitions GDP for this economy is defined as:   13 
 
   







(1! b) kt+1 ! (1!")kt ( )+ (1! at)ct + gt # $ % &+ atct + b kt+1 ! (1!")kt ( )
= wtntht + rtkt + prt
 (2.42) 
 
     
Definition 2: Monopolistically Competitive Equilibrium  
Given a sequence of government policies   M0,     {Mt+1,!kt,!nt}t=0
" , a competitive 
equilibrium is a sequence of allocations and prices that satisfies household optimization 
as given in definition 1, firm optimization as given by equations (2.25) -(2.37), 
feasibility (2.21)-(2.24), and the government budget constraint given by (2.41).  
 
3.  Characterization of Equilibrium (Steadystate analysis) 
General market clearing imposes the following steadystate restrictions on prices and 
allocations: 
 




     ! = "(1+ R)#1  (3.1)   14 
 




= (1+ R) / (1+$)
or









  (3.2) 
 
 
N = Ng + Ns  (3.3) 
     l =1! N   (3.4) 
 
   
Yg = AgKg
!Ng
1"!   (3.5) 
 
   
Kg = r / (Ag!Ng
1"!) { }
1
!"1  (3.6) 
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  (3.9) 




# !$K   (3.10) 
 
   
Yg2 = S / q  (3.11) 
 
   
Y2 = min(Yg2,S / q)  (3.12) 
 
   
a =
Yg !Yg2 ! b"K
Y2 !"K ! G +Yg !Yg2
  (3.13) 
 
   
C =
Yg !Yg,2 ! b"K
a
  (3.14) 
 
   
Mt
P 1t
= aC + b!K   (3.15)   15 
 
   





"# 2 $1   (3.16) 
 
Consider next two policies designed to support the credit services sector. The first is a 
transfer, !,. that affects the fraction of loan losses: 
 




(St +!) 1"#$(% 1 +% 2) & ’ ( )" (! "*)Kt { }  (3.17) 
 
This type of policy captures measures such as purchases of bad loans at less than market 
rates, and/or government guarantees on loans.  
Consider also a proportionate subsidy to the banking sector, !s: 
 




(St +") 1#$%(& 1 +& 2) ’ ( ) *#"Kt { }  (3.18) 
 This subsidy is reflects, for instance, the extension of 100% government guarantees of 
deposits to the banking sector that were made in Japan in the mid 1990’s. This 
guarantee acts to raise the amount of banking services provided at any given level of 
capital and labor inputs. 
 
The firm’s problem under this type of subsidy changes in the following way. 
 














= MCt   (3.19) 
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$(1%#1%# 2 )  (3.21) 
 
If the technology factor in credit goods production is held constant and there are no 
external effects to credit services production the following results can be derived. 
Lemma 1 If  ! 1 +! 2 <1  and q  and z are constant then an increase in  !s increases 
output and profits in the banking sector. 
Proof: Note that  (3.17) can be rewritten as: 
 
   



















1!,(#1+# 2 ) .  (3.22) 
 
The result follows immediately by noting that the real interest rate from equation (3.2) 
is invariant to changes in  !s and thus that the capital labor ratio in either sector is also 
invariant to changes in !s.  Finally note that from equation (2.38) that an increase in 
credit services output implies profits must also rise.  
 
Lemma 2 If  ! 1 +! 2 <1 and  ! "# 1 > 0 then an increase in R increases production net of 
fixed costs in the banking sector.  
Proof: Equation (3.1) and (3.2) imply: 
 











)  (3.23)   17 
or that the real interest rate is increasing in the nominal interest rate. This in turn implies 
from (3.2) that the capital labor ratios fall in both sectors.  Then the result follows from 
inspection of equation (3.22). 
 
Since inflation acts as a tax on labor supply and investment in this economy it will also 
likely be the case that the aggregate capital stock will fall.  Then from equation (2.38) 
profits in banking sector will also rise. 
  
Lemma 3 Suppose that !  is a fixed cost ( replace  !Kt with! ) . Then an increase in !  
has no effect on equilibrium consumption, investment, labor input or relative prices. 
This follows directly from inspection of equations (3.13) and (3.14). 
 
Lemma 4 An increase in government purchases lowers consumption and leaves other 
variables unchanged.  
Proof: The proof proceeds in a similar way to the previous proofs.  
 
In the more general situation where either the technology in the credit goods production 
sector or credit services sector faces and externality it is no longer possible to establish 
analytic results.  
 
4.  Calibration and results 
In this section we report results from some computational experiments in which we 
calibrate the model to the Japanese economy as of 1990 and then consider the 
implications of a decline in the inflation rate to its 2000 level.     18 
In order to facilitate comparison with other work, the calibration of Hayashi and 
Prescott (2002) is used as a reference point for calibrating the capital share parameter in 
the goods production sector, the depreciation rate of capital, the tax rate on capital 
income and the share of government purchases. The values for these parameters are 
reported in Table 1 below. The value for! , the leisure parameter is calibrated to data 
from 1983-1990 using equation (2.13).  The household parameter b which governs the 
share of investment goods that are cash goods is set initially to zero. This implies that 
all investment goods require banking services and creates a role for the banking sector 
in low inflation environments. The inflation rate is set to the 1990 CPI inflation rate of 
0.03%.  The remaining details of the calibration are specific to the assumptions about 
the industrial organization structure of the banking sector. We consider two distinct 
structures. The first is monopolistic competition. Under this market structure,  the 
capital share parameter in the banking sector,  ! 1, is set to 0.36, the same value used in 
the goods sector,  the labor share,  ! 2, is set to 0.36 and!, the increasing returns to scale 
parameter is set to a value of 1.4.  This is in the range of values used in by Hornstein 
(1993) (1.5) and Rotemburg and Woodford (1995) (1.4).  The fixed cost parameter ! is 
set to 0.0005. This corresponds to a loss rate of .1% on outstanding bank loans.  In 1990 
loans by commercial banks were about the same size as GDP. From Hayashi and 
Prescott the capital output ratio is about 2.  Thus loans are about half the size of the 
capital stock.  The markup, ! , is calibrated so that long-run profits are zero. This 
produces a value of !  of 1.93 or about the value estimated previously by Hall (19??). 
Finally, we assume that the technology parameter for credit goods production  q  is 
given by:    19 
     q = !"ln(mt / ct)  (4.1) 
 
This is the same functional form used by Aiyagari, Braun and Eckstein (1998) and can 
be motivated by a situation in which there are a continuum of credit goods that differ in 
the amount of credit services inputs they require. We set !  to 0.1. This is the same 
value estimated by Aiyagari, Braun and Eckstein (1998).  The complete calibration of 
the monopolistic competitive model is reported below in column 1 of Table 1. 
This calibration has several implications that can be used to assess the model. First it 
implies that the share of employment of banking in total employment is 2.1%. For 
purposes of comparison the share of financial services and life insurance employment in 
GDP was 3.5% in 1990. Second, the model implies that,  a, the share of consumption 
that is purchased as a cash good is: 0.92.  
 
To investigate the robustness of our conclusions to the market structure for the banking 
sector we also report results for the case where the banking sector is perfectly 
competitive and profits arise due to a strategic complementarity with goods production. 
Specifically it is assumed that
 
zt = ygt . And the capital and labor share parameters are   20 
set to a value of 0.1 and the markup is set to a value of 1.0. The complete calibration 
results for this specification are reported in column 2 of Table 1. 
Monopolistic Competition 
Table 2 reports the results for the monopolistic competition specification from 
simulating a drop in the steadystate inflation rate from  ! = 0.03 to a value of –0.007 the 
value of CPI growth in 2000.  The results in column 1 correspond to the 
(counterfactual) case where there is no policy response and no adjustment of either 
markups of the fixed cost to return long-run profits to zero. Observe that this decline in 
the steadystate inflation has dramatic effects on the size and profitability of the banking 
sector. Employment in banking drops by 41% and profits fall by 948%. These declines 
indicate that a decline from low inflation to negative inflation produces substantial dis-
intermediation. Even though by construction the banking sector is required for the 
provision of intertemporal credit, the demand for exchange credit to finance cash 
purchases is very low in a deflationary environment.   
This model also has implications for the level of loan losses. It implies that they will 
rise as the inflation rate falls.  To understand this result, note that in this economy the 
real interest rate depends on the inflation rate and a decline in the inflation rate also 
lowers the real interest rate in increases the steadystate capital stock output ratio and 
steadystate investment. This implies that losses on outstanding loans increase. 
Somewhat surprisingly welfare also falls. This is due to the fact that in the monopolistic 
economy inflation interacts with the productive inefficiency of this IO structure in a 
nontrivial way. This effect has been documented elsewhere in the literature (see e.g. 
Woodford (2002)).  To control for this effect one can set long-term profits to zero in the 
new steadystate. There are two ways to make long run profits zero. The first is to follow   21 
Rotemberg and Woodford(1995) and set the markup equal to the increasing returns 
parameter! = µ. (They assume ! 1 +! 1 =1.).  They set the value of the markup to 1.4 
(In our case ! =1/1.4). 
An alternative approach is that of Hornstein(1993) who adjusts the fixed cost coefficient 
to ensure that long-term profits are zero (see (2.39)  above) 
Results for these two cases are reported in columns 2 and 3 of Table 2. Column 2 
corresponds to the case where the markup is adjusted to bring profits back to zero. 
Column 3 corresponds to the case where the fixed cost term is lowered. Setting long-run 
profits to zero reduces banking employment further but welfare now rises.  
It is worth noting that the column 3 results can be given two interpretations. One 
interpretation is that this is what would happen over time due to entry and exit from the 
banking sector. Banks with high non-performing loan ratios would exit. Alternatively, 
this can be interpreted as a policy intervention that is designed to reduce loan losses. For 
instance, government purchases of bad loans or other policies that effectively lower the 
value of !  act help stem banking sector loses.  Independent of the interpretation, the 
model captures in a simple way why ridding banks of non-performing loans has been a 
focal point of recent policy debates.  Moreover, the model predicts that independent of 
how the adjustment occurs employment in the banking sector will fall.   22 
 
As described above, the model can also be used to investigate the impact of a subsidy to 
the banking sector such as the extension of a 100% guarantee on deposits. Results from 
this type of policy intervention are reported in Column 4 of Table 2. The subsidy is 
calibrated in a way so that the benefits of this subsidy are equivalent to a 100 basis point 
increase in the nominal interest rate. This type of policy intervention has a positive 
effect on banking employment.  Now employment falls by 30% as compared to 41% 
under the basline scenario. However, this policy has only has a negligible impact on 
profits. Most of the benefits of the higher subsidy get passed through to the two factors 
in the form of higher input prices.  If instead the subsidy is set at a level that is 
equivalent to a 200 basis point increase in the nominal interest rate, employment only 
drops by 16%. 
Finally, we also consider the impact of higher government purchases on the banking 
sector. Government purchases are by assumption a credit good in this economy and 
higher government purchases require more banking services. The effect of an increase 
in the share of government purchases in output from 0.13 to 0.15 is considered in 
column 5 of Table 2. This is the magnitude of increase in government purchases 
between 1990 and 2000. Even though government purchases are credit goods the   23 
measured increase government purchases only have a negligible impact on banking 
employment and profits relative to the baseline case. Banking employment falls by 39% 





The perfect competition case is described in Table 3. The baseline parameters are 
   !s = 0,!k = 0.48," = 0.976,# = 0.089,$ = 0.36,% 1 = % 2 = 0.1,& = 2.4,’ = 0( =1,) =1, 
g=0.13, b=0.0, q=1, 
   
Ag =1,As =1.4, and nu=0 ( to be included in revised first table). 
The results show in the first column that there is a comparable change in consumption, 
total employment, and investment, relative to the monopolistic competition model, 
when the inflation rate falls from 0.03 to –0.007. The main difference here is that 
banking employment falls by more and profits by less as compared to the monopolistic 
competition case. 
Variable Baseline  Effect of a deposit guarantee 
!=0.6
Effects of higher government 
spending g/y=0.14
consumption 5.28 5.14 4.40
employment 3.60 2.77 3.49
investment 14.38 14.61 15.30
banking employment -310.19 80.01 -75.40
profits -74.63 -54.30 -74.40
Welfare 1.60 -0.23 1.70
Table 3
Simulation Results of   a reduction in inflation from 3% to -.7%
Perfect Competition Specification
Percentage change relative to 1990 baseline (except real interest rate)  24 
The experiment of a subsidy to the economy that is also experiencing Japan’s –0.007 
inflation rate of 2000, produces an increase in employment in the banking sector; this 
stands in contrast to the monopolistic competitive model, while other results are more 
similar. The increase in government spending also produces similar results so the only 
big difference is in the banking employment and profits. It appears that the banking 
employment is more sensitive to changes in the effective price of the credit in the 
perfect competition model than in the monopolistic competition. 
(While the monopolistic competition model requires zero profits to be reestablished, the 




5.   Concluding Remarks 
In this paper we have described a dynamic economy in which the banking sector 
provides two services intertemporal credit which facilitates saving and investment 
activities and exchange credit which facilitates transactions. In this economy money is a 
substitute for exchange credit.  In equilibrium the relative price of credit services is the 
nominal interest rate and there is an important link between the conduct of  monetary 
policy  and the size and profitability of the banking sector. We have found that a move 
from moderate inflation to deflation can have a big effect on households’ demand of 
exchange services from the banking sector. This fall in demand in turn reduces bank 
employment and profitability of the banking sector when there are increasing returns 
and/or even small fixed costs associated with lending.   These effects are of a sufficient 
magnitude that they provide a powerful stimulus for a government policy response. We   25 
have investigated a variety of possible government responses and found that policies 
such as deposit guarantees are the most effective in stemming employment losses in the 
banking sector. Other policies that help banks cut losses on outstanding loans improve 
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